academic in the humanities and social sciences. As a full-time faculty member at a Chinese university for an extended period, rather than a visiting fellow, I was able to immerse myself in the academic and intellectual ambience as an "insider." Yet I feel that this experience is often an intellectual liability, not an asset, for I find myself entangled in the kinds of obsession and anxiety that my Chinese colleagues (including these three) have lived and experienced daily. My "Western" colleagues, that is, the MLQ editor and the other commentators in this issue, may look on this hustle and bustle with amazement, but the remedy for my own intellectual disorientation, if not dysfunction, lies elsewhere: a metacommentary on, or a symptomatic reading of, the Chinese obsession, the country's "anxiety of influence" with Western theory.
I take Fredric Jameson and the Chinese invention of what I would call Chinese Jamesonism as a case in point to illustrate the kinds of anxiety that my Chinese literary colleagues and I are experiencing. Furthermore, I hope to detect from the debates about Western literary theories some larger dilemma on the contemporary Chinese intellectual scene, especially the ever-intensifying battle between (Western) universalism and Chinese exceptionalism. In what follows I first offer a brief commentary on these three essays, drawing on Jameson's metacommentary as a method of interpretation and self-reflection. I try to tease out a few issues from each essay as a manifestation of some latent and deeper possibilities of experience. Next I try to situate these experiences within the historical contexts of the last four decades of gaige kaifang (reform and opening up) in China, in which "translating and borrowing" and "addressing Chinese issues with Western discourses" became the predominant modes of both intellectual inquiry and political decision and policy making. I then turn to Jameson's Chinese reception, or Chinese Jamesonism, to show how an eclectic American neoMarxist academic discourse has been reinvented in China on selected themes of postmodernism and Third World "national allegory." Chinese Jamesonism has little to do with what Jameson thinks and writes, yet the misreading of his theory is symptomatic of a dilemma on the contemporary Chinese intellectual scene. In conclusion, I argue that, as a "shadowy but central presence" in Jameson and other Western left theories ( Jameson 1984a: 188) , Maoism ought to be viewed not only as an indigenous, nationalist ideology of Chinese exceptionalism but also as a form of (revolutionary) universalism. In view of the campaigns that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has launched against universalism and for the construction of Chinese exceptionalism, a vigorous critique of the relationship between Maoism and Western left theories will shed light on the issues of politics and ideology underlying the "anxiety of influence" that this MLQ special issue tries to address.
The Anxiety of Influence: Western Theory in China Jameson (1971: 15) writes that "metacommentary . . . implies a model not unlike the Freudian hermeneutic (divested, to be sure, of its own specific content, of the topology of the unconscious, the nature of libido, and so forth): one based on the distinction between symptom and repressed idea, between manifest and latent content, between the disguise and the message disguised." Metacommentary is a reconstruction of the social situation or the original context of the ideas, thoughts, and texts intended to decode "the message disguised." In the case of the three Chinese essays in this issue, there may not necessarily be a Freudian repression, but their latent and disguised messages can certainly be gleaned through historical recontextualization. The historical context is the gaige kaifang from the late 1970s until today. The three essays address issues more specifically of the late 1990s to the present, when neo-Marxist critical theory and garden-variety "post-isms"-poststructuralism, postcolonialism, and postmodernism-were translated, borrowed, and appropriated in China en masse and became dominant critical discourse in Chinese academe. These more recent years contrast sharply with the decade of the 1980s, or the so-called Chinese cultural reflection movement. Chinese intellectuals then passionately embraced Western ideas from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, translating works of Sigmund Freud, Friedrich Nietzsche, Friedrich Hayek, Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Jean-Paul Sartre, Susan Sontag, the New Critics, and so forth.
At least three specific aspects of the historical context for the reception of Western theories should be noted. First, the brief yet historic period of the 1980s Chinese cultural reflection movement ushered in a heteroglossia of ideas, to borrow Mikhail Bakhtin's concept. Massive modern Euro-American liberal and conservative ideas opened up new ways of thinking about Chinese modernity, which threatened to subvert the powerful leftist tradition that has legitimated the CCP's rule. Second, the Marxist and leftist orthodoxy in China, largely scorned, and rejected by Chinese intellectuals in the 1980s, provided fertile ground for the reception of neo-Marxist and left-leaning Western theories. Third, a more assertive and increasingly nationalist China, especially after the 2008 global economic woes that showed the decline of Euro-American capitalism and China's simultaneous ascendance as the world's second largest economy, called forth renewed efforts for Chinese exceptionalism vis-à-vis Western universalism. Since Western literary theories, be they leftist, liberal, or conservative, are lumped together under the rubrics of Western ideas, they have become the targets of CCP-sanctioned campaigns against universalism. However, the assaults on universalism cause great anxiety and consternation, especially among those who have dedicated themselves to the translation, dissemination, and appropriation of Western theories they must now denounce.
Zhang Jiang's "On Imposed Interpretation and Chinese Construction of Literary Theory" is an adaptation of a series of polemical essays in Chinese that he has penned in recent years against "imposed interpretation" by Western literary theories (e.g., Zhang 2014a Zhang , 2014b . In this issue Zhang spells out his objective as such: "How to identify the fundamental flaws of contemporary Western literary criticism and the logical base of its core flaw is still an essential issue to be studied and discussed by Chinese scholars." He singles out some salient "flaws," such as "cutting off the connection between history and tradition, denying the advantages of adjacent schools, going from one extreme to the other, ignoring or deviating from literary practice, and rigidly applying methods, doctrines, and discourse dogma." Zhang critiques what he calls "off-field requisition," or "discourse replacement," referring to those practices of literary criticism that draw on other disciplines in the social sciences and humanities in an attempt to address issues other than literature per se. Among his culprits are Elaine Showalter, J. Hillis Miller, Fredric Jameson, and Terry Eagleton, whose manifest goal is political and social critique.
Zhang targets, as a central issue in those left-leaning or neo-Marxist theories, the trespassing of traditional perimeters of literary and cultural criticism to intervene in the broad political and social realms of the contemporary (Western) world. The critical "transgression" and "deterritorialization" underlying left-wing theories arise from an unquenchable desire for political and social intervention. Left-wing literary scholars more often than not confront realpolitik, partisan politics, and ideologies in terms of political economy, science and technology, finance and corporate management, public policy and diplomacy, and so on. Interventions in those areas by literary scholars ill-equipped with specific knowledge and expertise have caused, as the 1996 Sokal scandal in the journal Social Text demonstrates, serious concern among scholarly communities about the viability and credibility of research in the humanities.
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Zhang is probably right in calling to account such disciplinary transgressions in today's cultural and literary criticism. His anxiety, however, may lie not so much in rampant transgressive or "off-field" Western criticism as in the absence of a Chinese theory of literature or literary criticism: "We need to focus on the reality of Chinese literature if we want to construct a Chinese literary-theoretical discourse. Or, more specifically, we should make a systematic study of the rules of Chinese literary creation and read literary texts and explore the reception of these literary works. Only thus can we form our own body of literary theory of Chinese characteristics." "Chinese characteristics" turns out to be an essentially political label, widely used in the CCP's statements. The most famous one is "socialism with Chinese characteristics," as the hallmark of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up. Most recently, the Constitution of the Communist Party of China at the Nineteenth National Congress of the CCP in October 2017 enshrined "Xi Jinping thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era" (CCP 2017). Moreover, MLQ's readers will presumably sense in Zhang's essay a stylistic peculiarity even through translation. In other words, Zhang's style shows greater affinity to CCP political discourse than to academic writing, which would look somewhat odd to non-Chinese observers.
Wang Ning paints a much brighter and more optimistic picture than Zhang. Wang's essay lists several favorable attributes and contributions of three French theorists, Alain Badiou, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Jacques Derrida. Although the bulk of his essay deals with Sartre and Derrida, Wang's remarks on Badiou are the most telling. Wang finds a connection between Maoism, or a "Marxism with Chinese characteristics," and (revolutionary) universalism via Badiou, the ardent French Maoist. Wang writes that "since the Cultural Revolution has been and will continue to be recorded in history and critically studied by researchers, it would be more realistically viewed as a drastic revolution for humanity than merely a disaster for China. So it is a valuable legacy for all those engaged in studies of global Marxism or Marxisms, to which Maoism has undoubtedly made tremendous contributions." And we may well sum up that in China the Cultural Revolution has brought tremendous transformation in politics, economy, culture, and society, while in the West Marxist doctrine, including the Maoist sinicized Marxism, helped the birth of Marxism on university campuses and in intellectual circles. That is why many of today's leading Western left-wing intellectuals, including Jameson, Žižek, and Badiou, are greatly influenced by Marxism and Maoism and are particularly keen on the latter. This is certainly a valuable legacy not only to us Chinese scholars but also to international Marxist scholarship.
As the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-76) is officially condemned by the CCP's (1981) resolution as a political debacle and social calamity, and its legacy remains one of the most explosive and controversial issues in the post-Mao era, it is practically inconceivable to extol it publicly in China today "as a drastic revolution for humanity," as Wang's essay does. It is true that today's public endorsement of the Cultural Revolution by a small faction of ultra-leftists and by remnants of radical Red Guards has gained some momentum, encouraged by the ambivalent attitude of Xi Jinping's leadership toward the legacy of the Mao era. Nonetheless, any public discussion of the Cultural Revolution in the state-controlled media and academic publications in China is still strictly forbidden (e.g., Phillips 2016). Hence Wang's "disguised message," written for Englishspeaking readers of MLQ , should probably be viewed as something other than an explicit rehabilitation of the Cultural Revolution's reputation. It can be construed as an attempt to negotiate and compromise on the imperative to construct a "literary theory with Chinese characteristics" without denouncing or clashing head-on with Western universalism (or Western literary theories). Wang's brilliant pick of Badiou as a theoretical middleman, so to speak, is an effort to reconcile the tension between universalism and Chinese exceptionalism through Maoism. Yet Badiou's influence (and to some extent Žižek's) in China pales next to Jameson's. And the Chinese reinvention of Jamesonism showcases more strikingly than China's reception of Badiou how such a selective misreading of Western literary theory serves as a metacommentary on what is at stake on China's intellectual scene today.
It becomes obvious that the latent or disguised message of both Zhang's and Wang's essays is more than a need to construct an indigenous literary discourse that befits Chinese literary practice today. It is an anxiety induced largely by the domination of Western theories in Chinese academe. Chinese responses to the West have exhibited such anxiety since the mid-nineteenth century. Rather than go back to history, however, Zhu Liyuan's response to J. Hillis Miller's "end of literature" attempts to look forward, searching for a resolution of the contemporary dilemma in the era of the internet, social media, and visual culture that has cut across national boundaries. Zhu writes that "debates among Chinese scholars in the years following Miller's essay have revealed a strong anxiety regarding the future of literature. For those scholars, the Western context of Miller's theory is not important, or at least not a main concern. They care more about Miller's ominous declaration [of the end of literature in the age of the internet]." Zhu, however, does not lose sight of China's specific conditions in response to Western theory: "They [Chinese scholars] were all concerned with the same fundamental question: How can Chinese literature preserve its cultural distinctness while engaging in international exchange? When Miller's analysis of continued globalization was transplanted into the Chinese context, scholars were anxious about its universalizing and homogenizing perspective." The anxiety comes back, but it turns out to spring much less from ideological and political differences than from a time lag: "Miller's stance, which corresponds to the rapid changes of Western contemporary life, was not easily accepted by Chinese scholars at the time. In 2000 China's internet industry lagged far behind the United States', so Miller appeared to exaggerate the cultural conditions and therefore posture in his pessimistic view of literature. Scholarly controversy was inevitable in China." With China rapidly catching up in information technology, and with the cultural conditions that Miller describes in his "end of literature" declaration starting to appear in China, Zhu concedes that, "in their evaluation of cultural studies' impact on literary criticism, there is no fundamental disagreement between Miller and the Chinese scholars." In other words, as conditions ripen in China, disagreement will vanish, and "the Western context of Miller's theory is not important." Jameson's "universalizing and homogenizing perspective" overlaps with Miller's, so Chinese and Western scholars seem to have reached a consensus that postmodernism is ubiquitous.
Universalism versus Chinese Exceptionalism:
Jameson and Chinese Jamesonism Jameson came to China in 1985 and lectured at Peking University for a semester as a visiting professor. It was the moment when he embarked on his next major theoretical project, moving from writing primarily about literature and high theory to the broader spheres of architecture, film, the arts, and popular culture. Jameson's Beijing lectures focused on postmodernism, a project that began with his essay "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" and culminated in the book of the same title ( Jameson 1984b ( Jameson , 1991 . The text of Jameson's Beijing lectures was promptly published in a Chinese translation.
2 The Beijing semester afforded him a close look at modern Chinese literature, and in 1986, after returning to the United States, he published "Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism," which idolizes Lu Xun as the "supreme example" of Jameson's central thesis of Third World literature as "national allegory." Jameson (1986: 69-70) contends poignantly that the "neglect [of Lu Xun] in western cultural studies is a matter of shame which no excuses based on ignorance can rectify." It is worth noting that, as the Third World essay has been vehemently assaulted by postcolonial critics in the United States as a bad example of Jameson's deep-seated Eurocentrism, Lu Xun is again completely neglected, as if he were simply irrelevant. While Jameson's genuine respect for Lu Xun was eventually rewarded in China, as the Third World essay became another pillar of Chinese Jamesonism years after its publication, he missed the opportunity in Beijing to experience the Chinese cultural reflection movement, then at its apex. It can be argued that there were structural and logical parallels between the cultural reflection movement and the roughly simultaneous poststructuralist, postmodernist critique of Western modernity and Eurocentrism. During the 1980s Chinese intellectual leaders such as Li Zehou, Liu Zaifu, and Jin Guantao were engaged in passionate self-reflection on Chinese tradition and modernity, armed with newly translated Western liberal works from Immanuel Kant to Friedrich Hayek, Hannah Arendt, John Rawls, and Isaiah Berlin, to mention just a few. Their manifest goal was to relentlessly debunk China's twentiethcentury legacy of radicalism and totalitarianism, particularly the ultraleftist, Maoist legacy of the Cultural Revolution. Such self-reflection and critique were driven by a powerful commitment to democratic political reform in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, in which Mao's "proletarian dictatorship" threw China into an abyss of destruction. Even though Chinese intellectuals and Western postmodern philosophers and theorists seem to have widely divergent objectives, they have offered similarly far-reaching critiques of the passage to modernity, growing out of the global upheavals of the 1960s.
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The Chinese cultural reflection movement's "translating and borrowing from the West" and "addressing Chinese issues with Western discourses" selected Western liberal ideas and concepts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries rather than postmodernism. Now in hindsight, Chinese intellectuals of the 1980s remained suspicious of and vigilant against the leftist tendencies of Western theories, since the Maoist leftist legacy that Western theories were inextricably connected with was precisely their target. Western theorists, on the other hand, were preoccupied with deconstructing Eurocentrism and Western modernity and paid no attention to China's tremendous transformation and the associated cultural movements. In fact, the Western Left was generally baffled by post-Mao China's debunking of the Maoist legacy and suspicious of Deng Xiaoping's opening up as a capitulation to the capitalist world system. There was no evidence that the Western Left then sought to understand what had happened in the 1980s Chinese intellectual arena, except that each side remained suspicious of the other's objectives. Jameson's Beijing experience exemplified the missed opportunities and crossed paths.
The cultural reflection movement culminated in student protests in 1989 that threatened the legitimacy of the CCP's rule. The intellectual movement and student protests were crushed at Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989. Enter the 1990s. After Deng's 1992 pledge to continue economic reform, China's door reopened to Western ideas, though cautiously and selectively. The formerly feverish espousal of Western liberalism gave way to a vehement rebuttal of the liberal legacy by Western left intellectuals-that is, gave way to postmodernism-at least in the eyes of post-Tiananmen cultural and ideological apparatchiks in China. The onset of postmodernism, or Western theories from the mid1990s on, marked an abrupt turn in reception of Western theories in the Chinese humanities and social sciences. Leftist thinking mounted a peculiar comeback in China, via Western theories of poststructuralism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism, only to be safely quarantined within the academic circles of literary studies. Any radical and revolutionary references reminiscent of 1960s Maoism were relentlessly neutralized or eradicated. The only relics left after this meticulous cleansing were the hollowed-out references to Marxism itself in Western theories.
It took nearly two decades for Jameson's real fame to arise in China. A 2004 conference at Renmin University of China (a major social sciences and humanities institution, nicknamed "the Second CCP Central Party School") celebrated the publication of the four-volume Selected Works of Jameson ( Jameson 2004) . It is no coincidence that this collection is symbolically reminiscent of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, which also appeared in four volumes as the principal oeuvre of Mao (1965) . Even though Jameson's 1985 Peking University lectures on postmodernism were hailed as a monumental work, comparable to Bertrand Russell's 1920 Peking University lectures (see Yue 1987), Jameson was not recognized as the leading Western Marxist theorist for almost twenty years. Since the publication of his Selected Works, Chinese studies of Jameson have grown significantly. In addition to numerous books and articles focusing on his work, references and citations to his writings permeate Chinese academic publications in literature (including Chinese literature and comparative and foreign literature), cultural studies, history and philosophy, and so on.
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I have coined the term Chinese Jamesonism to describe a Chinese neoMarxist theoretical discourse, bearing Jameson's name, on the selected themes of postmodernism and Third World national allegory that seem well fitted to today's Chinese academic circumstances. However, Chinese Jamesonism has little to do with what Jameson thinks and writes. If there is a "message disguised," it can be construed as an anxiety about Chinese ideological identity rather than merely about mistranslation and misreading of Jameson's writings. In the post-Tiananmen interregnum of the 1990s and early 2000s, the interventionist politics of the 1980s cultural reflection movement vanished almost completely, while the commercialization of culture and academic professionalization became the order of the day. Various "postmodern" phenomena such as consumer culture, the culture industry, and the proliferation of Western-imported popular culture emerged in China's prosperous metropolises, such as Beijing and Shanghai. In post-Tiananmen China's social sciences and humanities, academic research must defer to political co-optation because of increasing restraints on political and ideological issues, and it must conform to the CCP policy that prioritizes studies of Marxism. The symbolic value of Jameson as a leading neo-Marxist academic in the United States, the bastion of capitalism, is immense, as the CCP leadership seems determined to contest US domination, and allies from within the "enemy camp," as it were, are warmly welcomed. Such a Cold War scenario of ideological antagonism seems unlikely, and the tension that might lead to it is largely diffused by extensive cultural and academic exchanges on the surface. Behind the curtains, however, the anxiety of reinventing China's own political ideology as the basis of Chinese exceptionalism vis-à-vis Western universalism looms large. Thus Jameson's postmodern theory has been received in China as a powerful critique of capitalist values and ideology from within the West, as most Chinese interpretations and appropriations of Jameson's work zero in on his critique of the cultural logic of late capitalism.
Another theme of Chinese Jamesonism is Third World national allegory. Chinese critics simply ignore US postcolonial critics' assault on Jameson's Third World essay, viewing it as one of the most important manifestations of postcolonialism, equivalent to Edward Said's Orientalism.
6 As a critique of Western colonialism and imperialism from within the West, and a rare instance of admiration for Lu Xun by a leading American scholar, the Third World essay is widely applauded by the Chinese. Jameson, in short, stands as a symbol of solidarity. Paradoxically, however, the essay's conceptual framework, or methodological basis, is that of allegory rather than symbol: "The allegorical spirit is profoundly discontinuous, a matter of breaks and heterogeneities, of the multiple polysemia of the dream rather than the homogeneous representation of the symbol" ( Jameson 1986: 73) . For Jameson, allegory is not only an interpretive strategy but also a definition of social texts. Readers unfamiliar with Jameson's theory may conflate his critical method and the subject of his criticism, especially when the method and the subject derive from different contexts and backgrounds, let alone when the subject, in this case the "Third World," traverses complex realms of political and social history. Jameson's postcolonial critics in the United States often neglect his theoretical framework in their attacks on the political issues (the geopolitical issues in particular). Ironically, most Chinese Jamesonists, not unlike US postcolonial critics, are only interested in the politics of the Third World. By the same token, the "national," rather than the "allegorical," part of the concept is celebrated, disregarding the inner logic of Jameson's interpretive strategy. In fact, allegorical reading is fully spelled out in The Political Unconscious ( Jameson 1981) as the foremost critical concept of his political hermeneutics. As the seminal work of Jameson's method, The Political Unconscious is regrettably the least understood and studied in China, due partly to its incomprehensible Chinese translation and partly to its vastly eclectic and complex content, covering almost the entire twentieth-century Western critical spectrum. Thus Chinese readers are encouraged by Jameson's translators to "utilize their own knowledge fully and their imagination boldly" in a "positive misreading."
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Another missing link in the Chinese appropriation of the Third World national allegory is Maoism. Amid massive Jameson studies in China, "Periodizing the 60s" is not mentioned at all, even though China figures prominently in it. The essay offers an overview of the 1960s from four angles: the history of philosophy, revolutionary political theory and practice, cultural production, and economic cycles. The narrative starts with Third World beginnings as the origin of the politics of otherness. After canvassing Asian and African decolonization movements, the civil rights and feminist social movements in advanced Western countries, and Sartre's critique of humanism and the rise of structuralism and deconstruction, Jameson moves to a "digression on Maoism." It can be read less as a "digression" than as Jameson's crucial obsession: "Maoism, richest of all the great new ideologies of the 60s, will be a shadowy but central presence throughout this essay, yet owing to its very polyvalence it cannot be neatly inserted at any point, nor exhaustively confronted on its own" ( Jameson 1984a: 188) .
Maoism indeed is "a shadowy but central presence" throughout Jameson's writings, as the rest of the essay demonstrates, particularly in Jameson's elaboration of Althusserianism and Althusser's Maoist connections: "What is less often remembered, but what should be 7 Wang Fengzhen, the principal translator and editor of Jameson's writings in Chinese, states that "we have to acknowledge the incredible difficulty to understand Jameson's writings. . . . We take the position of 'positive misreading,' that is, explicating (translating) the meaning of Jameson's works on the basis of our own knowledge, comprehension, and association. I say this not to excuse ourselves for the 'dishonest' translation, but to hope that readers can utilize their own knowledge fully and their imagination boldly, to make associations and therefore draw more inspirations from these works" (Wang 2004: 9). perfectly obvious from any reading of For Marx, is the origin of this new problematic in Maoism itself, and particularly in Mao Tse-tung's essay 'On Contradiction,' in which the notion of a complex, already-given overdetermined conjuncture of various kinds of antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions is mapped out" ( Jameson 1984a: 191) . The "overdetermined conjuncture" turns out in The Political Unconscious to be the third and most important horizon of interpretation:
We will therefore suggest that this new and ultimate object may be designated, drawing on recent historical experience, as cultural revolution, that moment in which the coexistence of various modes of production becomes visibly antagonistic, their contradictions moving to the very center of political, social, and historical life. The incomplete Chinese experiment with a "proletarian" cultural revolution may be invoked in support of the proposition that previous history has known a whole range of equivalents for similar processes to which the term may legitimately be extended. (Jameson 1981: 83-84) The so-called Chinese experiment of the Cultural Revolution was for Jameson largely imaginary, pieced together from limited, mostly indirect sources, such as personal testimonies, Chinese propaganda pamphlets, and international newswires, when China remained essentially closed off from the outside world. What matters for Jameson, however, is not so much the real events in China as the "Althusserian revolution" inspired by the Chinese, which in Jameson's (1981: 37) view "has produced powerful and challenging oppositional currents in a host of disciplines, from philosophy proper to political science, anthropology, legal studies, economics, and cultural studies." Thus Maoism for Jameson is a "central presence" via Althusser, on whose ideas much of Jameson's interpretive strategy is based.
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Discussion of Maoism as a Western invention (as opposed to the Chinese official canon of Mao) is largely absent in China today. The CCP leadership remains ambivalent about Mao's role during the PRC period , particularly the Cultural Revolution, and inquiries into the relationship between Maoism and Western critical theory remain highly sensitive, practically banned by the academic award and penalty systems.
In Jameson studies in China, or Chinese Jamesonism, his Chinese connections refer only to Lu Xun in the Third World essay, while his indebtedness to Maoism is simply glossed over. Maoism, however, plays more than a critical role in Jameson's theory. Largely thanks to Althusser's theorization, Maoism has become indeed a critical source of inspiration, if not the "origin," as Jameson claims, of Western theories of the 1960s that Chinese academics have embraced for the last two decades. Maoism emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in two separate versions: in the Third World context, Maoism served as a principal guideline for "missions of resistance," that is, for guerrilla warfare, as a radical means to achieve national liberation and decolonization. In the advanced capitalist context of western Europe, on the other hand, Maoism embodied the "politico-cultural model," especially for the French intellectual Left spearheaded by Althusser. These two versions correlated with each other in the sense that the pathways of Third World revolutionaries and radical Left intellectuals in the West, particularly France, often intersected as they sought revolutionary ideologies. Moreover, there is a deeper reason that Maoism appealed to both Third World revolutionary rebels and Left intellectuals in the West: Mao's determined pursuit of an alternative to the existing models of modernity, either the dominant capitalist modernity or the Stalinist model of "actually existing socialism" (Liu 2015: 13) . Maoism can be understood as a revolutionary form of universalism, with an enduring impact on the Western Left. In today's China, Western leftist theories that draw heavily on Maoism are often reappropriated or reinvented to "address Chinese issues with Western discourses," whereas Maoism as a critical source for Western discourses is simply neglected in the reappropriation process.
In the strenuous efforts of Chinese academics today to overcome "the anxiety of influence" from the West, the value of Maoism is recognized in Wang Ning's essay in this issue. But my excursion through Jameson's Chinese reception, or Chinese Jamesonism, suggests that the anxiety may pertain to larger issues than literary theories. Wang's interpretation of Badiou can be viewed as a reconciliation of the tension between universalism and Chinese exceptionalism through Maoism. Jameson is apparently a more plausible candidate for the conversation between Western universalism (in its more radical, leftist configurations) and Chinese exceptionalism. However, given that Chinese Jamesonism today derives primarily from political and ideological necessities, Maoism may remain a shadowy presence for Jameson, but it is a stark absence in Chinese Jamesonism. Insofar as Western theories are either summoned to address Chinese issues such as postmodern cultural conditions or Third World geopolitical status (as in the case of Chinese Jamesonism) or rejected as impediments to the construction of an indigenous "theory with Chinese characteristics" (as Zhang Jiang argues), the anxiety of influence will likely remain deeply entrenched.
Nevertheless, a renewed inquiry into missed opportunities or crossed paths, as Jameson's Chinese reception shows, may help us rethink the ongoing battle between universalism and exceptionalism. State-sanctioned Chinese exceptionalism appears to be a return to, or a reaffirmation of, cultural essentialism rather than a rearticulation of postmodern cultural relativism and multiculturalism. In this regard, a Jamesonian "allegorical spirit" that "is profoundly discontinuous, a matter of breaks and heterogeneities" may help us unsettle the reemergence of cultural essentialism. To construct a Chinese exceptionalism, Maoism may well serve as an indigenous political ideology for reaffirming a "nationalist essence" or "Chinese characteristics" (both of which are interchangeable in the CCP political and ideological discourse today). However, Maoism as a global invention of both Third World revolutionaries and the Western intellectual Left has been understood and appropriated as a (revolutionary) universalism that has drawn on, revised, and extended Marxism beyond national boundaries and that has exerted a far-reaching global influence. The "shadowy but central presence" of Maoism in Jameson, and, by the same token, in Althusser, Badiou, Žižek, and other Western leftist theorists, is a compelling reminder of the impossibility of cultural essentialism on which Chinese exceptionalism can be erected.
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